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Introduction 
The employer match of employee contributions is an 
important characteristic of 401(k) plans.1  The match 
was designed to encourage participation and contri-
butions – particularly by lower-paid employees.  How-
ever, at many companies, the employer match became 
a casualty of the financial collapse and ensuing reces-
sion. While several large companies have restored 
their match, it is still important to understand what 
causes such a response. 
This Issue in Brief attempts to explain why some 
firms suspended their match while others did not.  
It proceeds as follows.  The first section explains 
the rationale for, and mechanics behind, employer 
matching of employee contributions.  The second 
section considers the economic impact of the match.  
The third section describes the companies that have 
suspended their match.  The fourth section exam-
ines how several factors impact the probability of an 
employer suspending its match.  The results suggest 
that liquidity constraints, rather than profitability is-
sues, are the main reasons for suspending the match.  
The fifth section speculates about the likely impact 
of the 401(k) match suspensions on employees.  The 
final section concludes that cash-strapped companies 
appear to have been forced to cut back, and, if the pat-
tern follows that of the 2001 recession, most compa-
nies are likely to restore their match once the econo-
my recovers.  To the extent that the match is quickly 
restored, little harm may have been done – especially 
compared with the alternative of laying off workers.  
Why an Employer Match?
 
Under 401(k) plans, employees can save a percentage 
of their annual salary on a tax-deferred basis, which 
they may withdraw upon retirement.  Unlike tradi-
tional pension plans, in which employees are covered 
automatically and receive fixed annuities from their 
employer after retirement, participation in a 401(k) 
is entirely voluntary.  Despite the recent trend toward 
automatic enrollment, most employees must choose 
whether or not they want to participate and how 
much of their salary to contribute to the plan.2  Like 
all tax-deferred savings vehicles, the tax savings from 
a 401(k) are greater for the higher-paid, because they 
face higher marginal tax rates.  To encourage broad 
participation, Congress requires all plans to pass 
By Alicia H. Munnell and Laura Quinby*On the participation side, the relationship is 
straightforward.  The presence of an employer match 
produces a large initial return on the employee’s 
contribution that supplements the benefits of tax 
deferral and encourages participation.  Empirically, 
several studies have used cross-sectional data to 
explore the relationship between the presence of an 
employer match and 401(k) participation.  The results 
consistently show a positive relationship, whereby the 
presence of a match increases participation by 5 to 10 
percentage points.7  Several studies have also docu-
mented a positive relationship between the level of the 
employer match and 401(k) participation.8
On the contribution side, the relationship between 
the employer match and employee contributions is 
unclear.  Suppose a firm that previously did not match 
contributions decides to match 50 percent on the 
employees’ contributions up to 6 percent.  Some em-
ployees might lower their contribution rate because 
they need to contribute less to reach the same overall 
contribution level.  Other employees might increase 
their contributions up to 6 percent because they re-
ceive an extra 50 cents for each dollar they contribute.  
Hence, the theoretical outcome is ambiguous and the 
issue needs to be resolved empirically.9  Studies that 
examine the relationship between the average match 
rate and employee contributions generally find a posi-
tive relationship, although a few find no effect or even 
a negative one.10  Studies that carefully account for 
the effect of both the match rate and match level find 
that contributions increase with a higher match rate 
and a higher match level.11  
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a nondiscrimination test, which limits how much 
highly compensated workers can contribute relative 
to the rank and file.3  By matching employee contribu-
tions, employers encourage a broader spectrum of 
their workforce to join a 401(k) plan.4
Although employers are not obligated to make 
contributions to 401(k) plans, the vast majority of 
participants belong to plans that offer a match.  The 
probability that a company matches increases with 
plan size, but a match is fairly prevalent across the 
board (see Table 1).   
Table 1. Percent of Plans with Employer Match, 
by Plan Size, 2008






5,000 and more 92.9
All 94.1
Percent of plans 
with match
%
The employer match has two components: the 
percentage of contributions that the employer will 
match (the match rate) and the percentage of the em-
ployee’s earnings on which the match will be provided 
(the match level).  Although employers have adopted 
a variety of match rates (see Figure 1), the typical 
employer match consists of a 50 percent match on 6 
percent of the employee’s salary.5  Taken together, the 
typical employer match is thus 3 percent of employee 
earnings.  Most employers permit their workers to 
continue contributing on an unmatched basis past the 
6 percent match level.6
The Economic Impact of the 
Employer Match
A number of studies have explored factors that af-
fect 401(k) participation and contribution decisions.  
These studies consistently find that, even after ac-
counting for individual characteristics, the employer 
match is an important determinant.  
Figure 1. Distribution of Plans by Employer 
Match Rate, 2008
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Employers Suspend Their 
Match 
 
The propensity for employers to decrease or suspend 
their 401(k) match in times of economic hardship 
became evident in the wake of the 2001 recession, 
when several large companies (General Motors, Ford, 
DaimlerChrysler, Textron, Goodyear Tire & Rub-
ber, and Charles Schwab, among others) announced 
their decision.12  As the economy recovered, most of 
these firms restored their original matches.  But the 
phenomenon returned in spades following the 2008 
financial collapse and ensuing recession.  News ac-
counts suggest that 218 companies suspended their 
401(k) match between January 2008 and November 
2009 (see Figure 2).  We estimate that 4.9 percent of 
all 401(k) participants were affected.  (A list of compa-
nies that suspended their 401(k) match and estimates 
of the number of employees affected is available on 
the CRR website.  The participant counts come from 
the U.S. Department of Labor’s Form 5500.13) 
While match suspensions began as early as Janu-
ary 2008, the majority of employers instituted their 
suspensions between December 2008 and May 2009, 
with the peak occurring in February 2009. 
decisions and then using regression analysis to identify 
the importance of these factors. The discussion first 
describes the factors considered and then presents the 
regression results.   
Possible Explanations
Possible factors that may either encourage or discour-
age firms to suspend their match include the liquidity, 
profitability, and size/industry of the firm, as well as 
the nature of its pension arrangement.  
Two measures of liquidity or lack of liquidity were 
considered.
•	 Quick ratio. This variable, which is the ratio of 
cash, cash equivalents, marketable assets, and 
accounts receivable to current liabilities, measures 
the firm’s ability to discharge its current liabilities. 
In an economy facing a financial crisis and bank 
failures, companies may find it difficult to roll over 
their debt.  Such cash-strapped companies would 
use every method to reduce their exposure to the 
market.  The expectation is that the larger the 
quick ratio, the less likely the firm is to suspend its 
match.    
•	 Failure to transmit. This variable comes from the 
following question in the Form 5500: “Did the em-
ployer fail to transmit to the plan any participant 
contributions within the specified time period?” 
An affirmative response is set equal to one, a 
negative response equal to zero.  The notion is that 
delaying the transfer of contributions serves as a 
safety valve for cash-strapped employers, making it 
less likely that they will suspend their match.   
An important question is whether firms are sus-
pending their match to preserve their profitability.  To 
address that issue, the analysis includes a measure of 
profits. 
•	 Gross margin: This variable, which is the ratio of 
annual gross profit to the cost of goods sold, mea-
sures the firm’s profitability.  If profitability is the 
motive, the higher the ratio, the less likely the firm 
is to suspend its match.  
The nature of the firm’s pension arrangements 
could also affect the probability of suspending the 
match.
•	 Defined benefit plan: This variable is set equal to 
one if the firm has a defined benefit plan in addi-














Sources: Available upon request.
What Causes Employers To 
Suspend Their Match?
The following analysis attempts to sort out why some 
firms suspended their match when the economy 
collapsed while others did not.  The process involves 













1 1 1 1tion to its 401(k).  The hypothesis is that firms 
with defined benefit plans might be more likely 
to suspend the match because their employees 
already have some pension protection.  
•	 Employer contribution: The size of the employer 
contribution is measured by the ratio of employer 
contributions to the sum of employee and em-
ployer contributions.  The hypothesis is that the 
larger the employer’s contribution, the greater the 
financial burden and the more likely the company 
is to suspend the match.  
Finally, the characteristics of the firm and the 
industry may also affect the probability of a firm sus-
pending its match.
•	 Large firm: A firm is characterized as large if it 
has 2,000 or more employees.  The hypothesis is 
that larger firms have relatively larger 401(k) ex-
penses and therefore are more likely to suspend 
the match when under pressure.
•	 Manufacturing firm: The variable is set equal to 
one if the firm is in the manufacturing indus-
try.  Manufacturing firms – already weakened by 
global competition – are more likely to be hurt by 
the economic downturn and therefore more likely 
to suspend the match.  
The Results
The analysis uses financial data from Standard & 
Poor’s 2009 Compustat linked to plan data from the 
2007 Form 5500 filing.14  Of the 218 firms on the 
list we compiled, 165 could be found in Compustat.  
Combining these firms with an additional 2,517 firms 
in Compustat that did not suspend their matches 
produced a total sample of 2,682 firms.  Missing 
values in the Compustat data, however, reduced the 
final sample to 1,861 (127 suspenders, 1,734 non-
suspenders).  
The results, shown in Figure 3, are interesting on 
several levels – first and foremost in that they point 
to liquidity constraints as the primary reason employ-
ers suspend their 401(k) matches.  The quick ratio is 
significant and negative, indicating that firms with 
more short-term assets relative to liabilities are less 
likely to suspend their match.15  Similarly, failure to 
transmit employee contributions also has a statistical-
ly significant and negative impact on the probability 
of suspending the match.  It suggests that those firms 
willing to compromise on their accounting by holding 
on to employee contributions rather than transmiting 
them to the 401(k) are less likely to face the liquidity 
constraints that would force them to suspend their 
match.  Additionally, both firm characteristics are 
significant and positive, suggesting that large firms 
and those in the manufacturing sector are more likely 
to suspend their 401(k) match. 
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Figure 3. Effect of Selected Factors on Probability of an Employer Suspending its 401(k) Matcha
a The effects of the three continuous variables – quick ratio, gross margin, and contribution ratio – are for a one-standard-
deviation change from the mean.
b The quick ratio and fail-to-transmit variables are significant at the 5 percent level.  All other significant variables are sig-
nificant at the 1 percent level.
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Interestingly, firm profitability is not a significant 
factor in the decision to suspend the match, once 
liquidity has been taken into account.16  The same 
is true for the employer-to-total-contribution ratio, 
which serves as a measure of the size of the employer 
match.  The presence of a defined benefit plan is not 
significant either.  This last variable has been the 
subject of recent discussion, as one study noted that 
most firms with suspended matches also had defined 
benefit pensions.17  It is true that the incidence of de-
fined benefit plans is 10 percentage points higher for 
suspended-match firms than non-suspended-match 
firms (see Figure 4), but this difference apparently 
does not have a significant effect once other factors 
are taken into account.   
sions are a temporary or permanent phenomenon.  If, 
as was the case in the wake of the 2001 recession, the 
suspensions are temporary, the effects will probably 
be modest.  And, indeed, several large companies 
– accounting for 1.2 percent of 401(k) participants –  
have restored their match.18  Moreover, the match sus-
pension must be compared with the impact of other 
ways firms could have responded.  For example, cut-
ting the employer match may have been an alternative 
to cutting payrolls by 3 percent.  On the other hand, 
if these suspensions lead to a permanent decline of 
the employer match, significantly fewer people will 
participate in 401(k) plans – especially among the 
lower-paid – and many of those affected will end up 
with an inadequate retirement income.  
Conclusion
The recent financial crisis and ensuing recession has 
once again sorely strained 401(k) participants.  As in 
2000, employees have been reminded that they are 
on the hook for financial risk.  At the same time, it is 
once again clear that the employer match, a valued 
component of 401(k) plans, is neither mandatory nor 
permanent.  About 5 percent of active participants 
in 401(k) plans have seen their employer’s match 
suspended.  The key cause of this phenomenon is 
likely a lack of liquidity on the part of employers, 
which renders them unable to continue their previous 
contributions.  As the crisis abates, companies appear 
to be restoring the match.  If this trend continues, the 
suspensions may have done little harm and may have 
been better than the alternative of cutting payroll or 
laying off workers. 
Figure 4. Percent of 401(k) Firms with a Defined 
Benefit plan
Source: Authors’ calculations from U.S. Department of 
Labor (2007).
 
Impact of Suspensions  
on Individuals
The question is the impact that these suspensions 
will have on participation and contributions.  Inertia 
suggests that the vast majority of people enrolled in 
401(k) plans will not leave.  Fewer new employees 
might join but, with little hiring, the impact is likely 
to be small.  On the contribution side, inertia is also 
likely to result in unchanged employee contributions.  
Thus, without the employer match, employees will 
see less going into their 401(k) accounts. 
The seriousness of the current suspensions of em-
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Endnotes
1  Employer contributions can take a variety of forms, 
including voluntary matches of employee contribu-
tions, as well as involuntary profit-sharing, money 
purchase, and employer stock ownership plan (ESOP) 
contributions.  Of these, matching, profit-sharing, 
and ESOP contributions can all vary as economic 
conditions change.  However, this study focuses only 
on the role of the more common employer match. 
2  A recent trend toward automatic enrollment in 
401(k) plans has sought to increase participation. 
Employees who join companies with automatic 
enrollment participate in their employer’s 401(k) by 
default, unless they specifically request to opt out.  In 
2008, about 42 percent of companies had adopted 
automatic enrollment (Profit Sharing/401(k) Council 
of America, 2009).
3  Internal Revenue Service (2009).
4  Munnell and Sundén (2003).  Mitchell, Utkus, and 
Yang (2006) suggest an alternative explanation of 
employer matching – namely, that companies offer a 
match in order to attract and retain higher-paid work-
ers, who value the tax benefits of 401(k) saving. 
5  For more detailed information on the heterogeneity 
of matching structures, see Mitchell, Utkus, and Yang 
(2005). 
6  As per Internal Revenue Code, employees are not 
permitted to make contributions in excess of $16,500 
in 2009 and 2010.  However, employees over 50 years 
of age can make an additional contribution of $5,500 
per year.  Total employer and employee contributions 
are not to exceed the lesser of 100% of the employee’s 
compensation, or $49,000, in 2009 and 2010. 
7  For example, see Papke and Poterba (1995); Papke 
(1995); Basset, Fleming, and Rodrigues (1998); 
Kusko, Poterba, and Wilcox (1998); and Beshears, 
Choi, Laibson, and Madrian (2007). 
8  Papke and Poterba (1995); Clark and Schieber 
(1998); Munnell, Sundén, and Taylor (2000); Huber-
man, Iyengar, and Jiang (2003); and Engelhardt and 
Kumar (2006).
9  More precisely, in the wake of the introduction of 
the match, those employees already contributing 6 
percent should lower their contributions because of 
the income effect, while those contributing less than 
6 percent experience an offsetting income effect and 
substitution effect, making the outcome ambiguous.  
The effects are similar for increasing the match rate 
while maintaining the same match level.  The impact 
of raising the match level, keeping the match rate 
constant, depends on the employee’s initial position.  
For those contributing below the old match level, 
the increase should have no effect.  For those at the 
old match level, contributions should increase (the 
substitution effect).  For those above the old but below 
the new match level, the outcome is ambiguous (the 
offsetting income and substitution effects).  For those 
contributing above the new threshold, contributions 
should decrease (the income effect).  For further 
discussion, see Choi, Laibson, and Madrian (2004).  
Most of the empirical literature has focused on the re-
lationship between the match rate and average 401(k) 
contributions and does not account for the effect of 
both the match rate and the match level.
10  Andrews (1992) finds that a higher employer 
match rate reduces the average 401(k) contribution; 
Bassett, Fleming, and Rodrigues (1998) find no 
effect; Papke and Poterba (1995), Even and Macpher-
son (2004), Kusko, Poterba, and Wilcox (1998), and  
Munnell, Sundén, and Taylor (2000) find a positive 
relationship.  Papke (1995) finds a positive effect at 
low match rates but a negative effect at higher rates.  
This finding is consistent with Munnell, Sundén, and 
Taylor, who find that once the match exists, increasing 
the match rate has a negative, albeit small, effect on 
contributions.  
11  See Choi, et al. (2002); and Engelhardt and Kumar 
(2006).
12  See Munnell and Sundén (2003); and Profit 
Sharing/401(k) Council of America (2002). 
13  The DOL requires pension plan sponsors to file 
an annual Form 5500 report detailing their plans’ fi-
nances, participants, and administrators.  The form is 
comprised of eight schedules; the main form contains 
identifiers for each plan, schedule B contains actu-
arial reports for defined benefit plans, and schedule Issue in Brief 7
H contains financial information.  The data used in 
this study are for 71,864 pension plans sponsored by 
60,395 firms.  The 218 firms presented on the CRR 
list employ at least 100 employees and filed Form 
5500 reports for 2007.
14  Standard & Poor’s (2009).  The financial variables 
– quick ratio and gross margin – and the industry vari-
ables are based on Compustat data for fiscal year 2009.   
The plan characteristics fail to transmit, contribution 
ratio, has a DB, and large firm are based on data in the 
2007 Form 5500. 
15  The timing of the data could affect this causal 
interpretation, since quick ratio is coincident with the 
decision to suspend the match.  However, when we 
ran the regression using each company’s quick ratio 
in fiscal year 2008, the results were identical.  
16  Gross margin is positively correlated with the 
quick ratio (correlation coefficient of 0.2); failure to 
transmit is not.  Removing the liquidity variables 
from the model produces a significant, negative coef-
ficient on gross margin.  However, we consider the 
model that takes liquidity into account to be a better 
representation of the situation faced by employers.
17  Employee Benefit Research Institute (2009).
18  To date, 21 companies have reinstated their match, 
including 7-Eleven, AARP, American Express, Auto-
Group, Black and Decker, CTS, Commercial Vehicle 
Group, Dollar Thrifty, Eastman Kodak, FedEx, Forbes, 
General Motors, Harman International Holdings, 
Intermountain Healthcare, JP Morgan Chase, Kap-
Stone Paper and Packaging, Libbey, Mercury General, 
Regions Financial, Starbucks, Stein Mart, and Zep. 
Together, they employ approximately 1 percent of ac-
tive 401(k) participants. References
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Table A1. Summary Statistics for Suspended Match Regressions
Appendix A
Variables
Suspend match 1 0 0 0
Quick ratio 1.301 1.115 1.951 2.552
Fail to transmit 0.063 0.244 0.142 0.349
Gross margin 0.335 0.180 0.386 0.232
Has a DB plan 0.394 0.491 0.287 0.453
Employer contribution 0.282 0.119 0.276 0.132
Large firm 0.764 0.426 0.554 0.497
Manufacturing firm 0.551 0.499 0.473 0.499
Number of observations 127 1,734
Mean
Match suspended Match not suspended
Standard deviation Mean Standard deviation
Sources: Authors’ calculations from U.S. Department of Labor (2007) and Standard & Poor’s (2009).
Table A2. Effect of Selected Factors on Probability of 
an Employer Suspending its 401(k) Match
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ** Denotes sig-
nificance at the 5 percent level and *** at the 1 percent level.  This 
table reports the marginal coefficients and standard deviations from 
a probit model in which the dependent variable is a binary variable 
indicating whether the employer suspended its 401(k) match, condi-
tional on having offered the match previously. 
Sources: Authors’ calculations from U.S. Department of Labor (2007) 
and Standard & Poor’s (2009).
Variables
Quick ratio       -0.009
  (0.004)     
Fail to transmit      -0.035
     (0.012)
Gross margin -0.031
    (0.022)
Has a DB plan       -0.004
    (0.012)
Employer contribution       -0.033
     (0.038)
Large firm 0.044
     (0.011)
Manufacturing firm 0.029
     (0.011)
Pseudo R2     0.046
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